Background As general practice becomes increasingly computerised, data security becomes increasingly important for both patient health and the efficient operation of the practice. Objective To develop guidelines for computer security in general practice based on a literature review, an analysis of available information on current practice and a series of key stakeholder interviews. While the guideline was produced in the context of Australian general practice, we have developed a template that is also relevant for other countries. Method Current data on computer security measures was sought from Australian divisions of general practice. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with general practitioners (GPs), the medical software industry, senior managers within government responsible for health IT (information technology) initiatives, technical IT experts, divisions of general practice and a member of a health information consumer group. The respondents were asked to assess both the likelihood and the consequences of potential risks in computer security being breached.
Background
Information security has been defined as a process for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of electronic data. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] In general practice, data refer to clinical, demographic and financial information, and keeping these secure is important for both patient health and the efficient running of a practice.
Australian general practice is becoming increasingly computerised. By the year 2000, almost 90% of practices were using computers, particularly for administrative tasks. 10 The proportion of practices using clinical software is not known exactly, but it is estimated that 80-90% of GPs use computers for generating prescriptions. 11 This paper outlines the principles of developing computer security guidelines for family medicine/ general practice. The authors recognise that GPs in other countries might choose to adapt these principles to accommodate local circumstances depending on cultural, technological and health service factors. However, our study could provide a useful template for the development of such guidelines in other countries.
Methods
Several strategies were used by Peter Schattner and Catherine Pleteshner to develop computer security guidelines for Australian general practice.
Reviewing the literature on computer security in the health industry A literature review was undertaken with Medline, ProQuest and Google. Various keywords were employed including combinations of computer security, information security, general practice, information technology (and IT), computers, training doctors, health informatics and doctors and the internet. Non-research literature was also reviewed, particularly the guidelines produced by Standards Australia and the draft guidelines on computer security developed by the Australian General Practice Computing Group (GPCG) in 2001. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 12 Reviewing existing data from surveys in general practice Australia has 118 divisions of general practice; these are regional organisations funded by the Australian Government to support general practice. In December 2003, all of these divisions were contacted to see if they had undertaken surveys on computer security among their GP members. Only three divisions were in a position to provide comprehensive survey information.
Interviewing key stakeholders
We conducted 14 key informant telephone interviews, which included GPs (4), a representative of the medical software industry association, government representatives (3), experts in IT (3), relevant staff from divisions of general practice (2) and one member of a health information consumer group. The consumer representative had experience with health IT, and the three government representatives included nominated senior managers responsible for the management and implementation of key Australian Government health IT initiatives.
The objectives of the interviews were to:
. conduct a risk assessment on the likelihood and consequences of breaches in computer security in general practice . obtain risk management advice . obtain suggestions for the implementation of security guidelines in Australian general practice and identify potential barriers to their uptake.
An interview schedule was developed to meet these objectives by reviewing the literature, with particular reference to publications by Standards Australia and the earlier GPCG draft IT security guidelines. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 12 The views of each key informant were transcribed and arranged according to the themes outlined in the original, semi-structured interview framework. The identities of the respondents have been kept confidential. Computer security risks have been divided into organisational and technical ones. The interviewees were first asked to consider what would be the likely consequences to both the patient and the practice if a risk were realised. The following scale was used:
Consequences (magnitude)
. High -of major significance to the business or to the patient . Medium -important, but not of critical importance . Low -a nuisance, but can cope with this without too much difficulty
The interviewees were also asked to comment on the likelihood of nominated and other technical risks occurring. They were asked to make this assessment on the basis of not only their own experience but also on their observations when assisting colleagues, and through insight gained by other exchanges within the profession. The following working definitions for likelihood were used:
Likelihood
. High -very likely to occur within the next 12 months . Medium -might occur within 12 months . Low -not very likely to occur within 12 months Both patient and practice business risks were taken into account, and risk management included a consideration of the cost of preventing a breach in security.
Results

Literature review
A search of the peer-reviewed literature on computer security in general practice revealed virtually no articles based on original research. A few papers described overseas studies in nursing, specialist medicine or hospital settings, none of which necessarily applied to Australian general practice. The vast majority of the articles were reviews. Computer security guidelines to date have generally been based on 'expert opinion' rather than quantitative risk assessments. [13] [14] [15] [16] For example, information published on the reasons why GPs should encrypt electronic data before transmission elsewhere does not give any evidence on how often problems have arisen by not encrypting. 17 Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that the security of patient information is important for the proper ethical, legal and professional functioning of the practice. 18 Unfortunately, there are several threats to this security in general practice, including GP use of the internet. 19 The relationship between confidentiality of personal health information and the use of computers and the internet was raised by the Australia National Health Information Management Advisory Council in 2001. 20 The Privacy Commissioner reported that many Australians believe there is less privacy now than there has been in previous years and that computers make it easier for confidential information to fall into the wrong hands. 21 As a consequence, policies are needed to guide processing, receiving, modifying, disseminating, sending, storing and disposing of patientrelated healthcare data. 16 The Australian Government has responded by passing the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 which addresses the need to safeguard personal information in the private sector. 22 This applies as much to paper records as it does to electronic ones in medical practice.
Information security is not simply a technical or legal issue. 13 Compliance with guidelines depends to a large extent on medical practitioners and practice staff believing in the value of the data they hold. A culture of security might encourage health professionals to develop appropriate IT policies and procedures. 13 Australian surveys on data security
There are few surveys on computer security in Australian general practice, and poor response rates characterise those that exist. Nevertheless, a few studies have been published and these raise concerns about the adequacy of computer security procedures (see Table 1 ).
The surveys reveal that, to date, written IT policies and procedures, as well as the appointment of IT coordinators within practices, have not been widely adopted. Although most practices back up their data, they do not often check that these backups have worked. Further, most practices are not confident that they adequately understand the technical aspects of backing up. Planning for computer disasters also appears to be inadequate. User access control (through the use of passwords) is not strictly adhered to, and other basic protective procedures, such as the correct use of anti-virus software and firewalls, are of concern. Unfortunately, it appears that practices have been unwilling to spend sufficient money to obtain adequate professional IT support.
Information based on key informant interviews
The consensus from the interviewees was that the most important issue in computer security in general practice is the backing up of data. Other important issues raised included physical and internet security (firewalls, anti-virus solutions and encryption) and the confidentiality of patient records. Further, a number of GPs observed that most general practices were relatively small businesses, and many had limited inhouse knowledge of, or expertise in, computer security, which was therefore considered somewhat beyond their reach.
Questions were asked on specific aspects of IT security as follows:
Organisational aspects (see Table 2 )
IT POLICIES IN THE PRACTICE
The importance of a practice developing an IT policy was recognised:
'In my experience, where there are no IT policies there is generally no IT focus ... there is no investment in 
PRACTICE IT CO-ORDINATOR
Similarly, most respondents felt that having an IT coordinator was important, especially for the business aspects of general practice.
PRACTICE DISASTER PLAN
Disaster plans are required when the computer system 'goes down'. Respondents indicated that they thought there was considerable risk in not having a practice disaster plan. They considered it vital to have an alternative system in place whereby they could keep booking and treating patients. 
EMAIL AND INTERNET POLICIES
Most respondents considered that there was a substantial risk to both patients and the practice from not having practice-wide email and internet policies. However, some thought that as there was currently limited use of email and the internet for clinical purposes, the actual risk is likely to be low for the time being.
ACCESS RIGHTS TO DATA
A clear protocol on who has access to which data is essential to reduce the risk of inappropriate access to information, both clinical and financial. However, most thought that compliance with national privacy legislation was cumbersome and costly.
Technical aspects (see Table 3 )
BACKUPS AND RESTORATIONS
The respondents felt that there was a reasonable likelihood of backups failing. The risks to both patients and the business were considered to be of major significance although difficult to quantify. There were considerable monetary implications for GPs not having effective data backup strategies in place.
SCREEN SAVERS
Respondents considered the lack of screen savers to be a relatively low risk to both patients and the business. The main risk was in terms of litigation for breach of confidentiality.
PASSWORDS
A number of GP respondents explained that the widespread failure by GPs and their practice staff to use passwords was as a result of a high degree of mutual trust. One commented that although each individual GP in the practice had his/her own password, these were collected by one of the practice staff and then written on a piece of paper that was hung up in the back office area. It also appeared that as the size of practices increased, so did the risk of a breach in security associated with passwords.
MALICIOUS CODE AND FIREWALLS
Not protecting computers against malicious code (such as viruses) was generally thought to pose a high risk, particularly to the business. This was especially so where GPs and practice staff regularly accessed the internet. Rectifying the ensuing problems such as computer crashes was costly, time-consuming and disruptive to the day-to-day operations of the practice. One GP commented on one such experience:
'The system was down for some time ... it took quite a lot of time to eradicate the viruses ... some of them are very difficult to get rid of.' (GP, interview transcript)
Respondents varied in their assessment of the magnitude of risk to the patient, some considering this to be minimal.
POWER SURGES
Power surges were thought to be more likely in rural rather than metropolitan settings, and the magnitude of risk was considered greater for the business than for patients.
ENCRYPTION OF DATA
Respondents reiterated the generally-held view of the need to encrypt patient data for electronic transmission beyond the practice. The risk of not doing so was thought to be considerable, particularly for breaches of patient confidentiality; however, litigation was also a possible outcome of breaches to privacy. It was noted that only a minority of practices had adopted the Australian Government's freely available encryption solution -Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). ' We don't have, as a practice, any particular organised approach to encryption of things like specialists' letters.' (GP, interview transcript)
OTHER TECHNICAL RISKS
Two other areas of risk identified were:
. doctors trying to tinker with their computer systems beyond their levels of expertise . not replacing ageing IT infrastructure until some part of it failed.
The risk analysis (summarised in Table 4 ) revealed the priority ratings for organisational and technical security risks for Australian general practice. Protection against malicious code and the use of firewalls were rated as high priorities, as were the need for IT policies and disaster recovery plans. The use of screen savers, protection against power surges and the use of encryption were considered low priority.
Discussion
This paper reports on the development of a set of computer security guidelines in Australia. These * Respondents from the government sector indicated that they were not in a position to make an informed comment.
guidelines were based on information from other published guidelines, surveys which documented some of the shortcomings in the adoption of computer security measures, and the opinions of experts in the Australian context. Unfortunately, little research has previously been undertaken to justify how generic computer security guidelines should be modified to make them applicable to general practice. This study has attempted to make these guidelines relevant to GPs, and this should assist in their adoption. The five surveys referred to provide some indication of the extent of the problem of computer security in Australian general practice, although the findings are likely to be of limited accuracy. Most of these studies had poor response rates (less than 50%) and did not use validated data collection instruments. Further, it is likely that considerable improvements have been made to computer security practices even within the few short years that have passed since these studies were done. It is interesting that the findings of these surveys are consistent with those that have been undertaken in Switzerland and Belgium in 2006 by two of the authors, Heinz Bhend and Johan Brouns. These also suggest that GPs are not taking adequate measures to ensure the security of data in their practices.
The information gathered in the context of Australian general practice was used to produce guidelines which can be accessed on www.gpcg.org. A summary checklist was derived (see Table 5 ), which provides a simple, one-page set of computer security items which GPs can use to see if appropriate procedures have been put in place. Ideally, the guidelines and summary checklist should be evaluated in the field to find out just how usable they are.
Nevertheless, as a place for others to start, this study illuminates a set of principles that have been selected and used to develop computer security guidelines for general practice. These principles can be summarised as follows:
. understand what has been developed to date within one's country and elsewhere (a literature review) . understand the local issues (i.e. gather information about current computer security problems and the socio-technical barriers to overcoming them) . finally, ask experts (GPs, those in the IT industry, GP professional organisations, government and consumers) what needs to be done and how best to do it.
Following, whilst adapting, these steps should help other countries develop IT security guidelines which are relevant to their own requirements. Once such guidelines are produced, how can we encourage GPs to adopt them? GPs will need incentives, training and support. Respondents in this study emphasised the importance of human factors over purely technical solutions, for example, the need for a practice to identify someone who co-ordinates security issues, including ensuring practice staff and GP training.
The Australian Government has provided financial incentives to encourage GPs to adopt computer security measures in their practices. It has also funded the nationwide distribution of the computer security guidelines referred to in this paper. These guidelines and accompanying templates are available at no charge on the internet (www.gpcg.org). Finally, the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners has taken up the majority of the suggestions described in the guidelines and incorporated them into its Standards for General Practice which form the basis for practice accreditation in Australia. 27 Other countries will need to adapt guideline implementation strategies to suit their own healthcare systems, the extent of adoption of information technologies and other organisational and political factors. The guidelines themselves will not be the same in countries with advanced rather than basic IT systems in health. For example, countries which already use shared electronic health records will need to add another layer of security. However, the principles of how to develop guidelines are relevant to countries that currently exhibit a range of IT practices within the primary healthcare sector.
